This topic was closed on account of being silly, without fully exploring the legitimacy of the need for this feature.
I think the problem remains the same. Anyone who is sufficiently motivated to force you to enter your password under duress either already knows about the "duress mode" and won't buy it or will become much more upset with you when none of the passwords actually work.
This is false, similar to TrueCrypt and it's many predecessors that picked up after it, such as VeraCrypt, the idea is that you can have false data that has the appearance of being sensitive. "Outer vs Hidden Volume". Who said the passwords don't work, or that you cannot have dummy data within the database?
A border patrol agent can ask for any passwords they please, Facebook, Instagram, even your 1Password password. What happens if you store your SSH or PGP keys or other forms of Private Keys and your device is downloaded? What happens if the border patrol agents know what to do with this data? You could be pwned before you can get to a public wifi, activate your VPN and update your digital fingerprint.
Duress-mode seems to be a fully reasonable request for a company responsible for keeping the keys of its users safe. The only, and best solution for the unlikely but possible situation of duress, is a duress mode. Very simple: user enters a duress password, and 1PW opens only the Duress vault. I feel as though it's an important subject to talk about and not dismiss as being paranoid or superfluous.
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