Feature Request: YubiKey Support
Wouldn't it be nice if 1Password supported YubiKeys? Like if it had an option to require me to supply a YubiKey code every time it autofills a form. Since it's a simple keypress, it wouldn't be a hassle, and it would provide additional security instead of just blindingly filling out forms.
If you're not sure what YubiKey is, check this out: http://www.yubico.com/
It's pretty awesome.
Thanks,
Tomas
If you're not sure what YubiKey is, check this out: http://www.yubico.com/
It's pretty awesome.
Thanks,
Tomas
This discussion has been closed.
Comments
http://support.agilewebsolutions.com/project.php?issueid=134
(reference 10359)
--
Gita Lal
1Password Help Desk
http://1password.com
http://support.agilewebsolutions.com
Assuming that's not possible. Is there any other way to integrate Yubikey then?
~lifeboy
1) How is the one time usage password generated and validated?
2) Is that password based upon a timestamp?
3) If so how do you protect from someone else generating an spoofed password using your seed and the timestamp?
http://support.agilewebsolutions.com/project.php?issueid=134
--
Gita Lal
1Password Help Desk
http://1password.com
http://support.agilewebsolutions.com
http://twitter.com/1Password
Please you code wizards @ agilesolutions have a look this way
The Yubikey sounds interesting. I'm trying out Rohos Login, but I would rather have it built into the OS. With all the phishing and rootkit issues on Windows, these things start to become more important.
-jon
Technically, you could move the Agile Keychain to a USB thumb drive and when it is unplugged the data isn't even on the Mac so there isn't anything to unlock.
Personally, I just got my Yubikey and if a site like google starts to support it as a part of openId, it could go fairly far. especially in the financial industry.
-jon
I just order of them several last week, but it sounds like 1Password would be a good mate.
A YubiKey would address the weakest link in 1Password: the master password. The master password needs to be manually typed in every time, so it is usually memorable and relatively short, and therefore less strong. Since it also doesn't change it is also vulnerable to keyloggers or people watching you type it in.
The YubiKey is a hardware One Time Password (OTP) device. Every time you use it, it generates a different OTP string, so keyloggers are not a threat because replaying the OTP string will not work. The OTP is also very long (128 bits), so it is also very strong.
The YubiKey has some important advantages over other hardware devices. Firstly, it emulates a USB keyboard, so no special drivers are required -- just plug it in, press the button, and it "types" out the one-time string. Secondly, unlike other one-time-password fobs you don't have to read off a number and then manually type that in. Thirdly, unlike enterprise oriented solutions, you don't need a server environment to validate the strings (it can all be done locally on the user's off-line Mac, although Yubico also provides servers). Fourthly, its security is based on cryptographically strong AES-128, which doesn't have false positives or false negatives like biometric devices do. Finally, it is extremely small, robust, and inexpensive (especially in bulk, maybe AWS can resell them to 1Password customers).
Steven, here are some short answers to your questions:
Firstly, a brief overview of what the OTP string is: it is simply a fixed serial number in the clear, followed by the AES-128 encrypted ciphertext of these fields: private ID (6 bytes), usage counter, timestamp, session usage counter, random number, and a checksum. The Yubikey device is configured with a secret key to perform the AES-128 encryption. The thing validating the OTP string also has the secret key, which it uses to decrypt the OTP string. If the OTP string decrypts properly, then it is assumed that the YubiKey generated it (since it is the only other thing that has a copy of the secret key).
1) Here's how it could work. The user would configure their YubiKey with a secret, and they would also configure it into 1Password. Instead of typing in the master password, a OTP string could be entered using the Yubikey. The 1Password program will first check the serial number to see if it is a known Yubikey. Then it will try to use its copy of the secret to decrypt the OTP string: if it decrypted successfully then it knows the creator also has the secret. The wonderful thing about YubiKey is that they publish all the algorithms, so implementing your own checking code on the 1Password side is possible and you can see there are no back-doors. They also provide sample code in C and Java.
2) The password is not based on a traditional timestamp, but uses something that is functionally similar -- the combination of the usage counter, timestamp, and session usage counter. The YubiKey device does not have a clock, which is an advantage because there is no battery to fail. It uses a "usage counter" that increments every time you plug the YubiKey into a USB port. And that is supplemented by an 8Hz "timestamp" clock and
"session usage counter" (both of which reset everytime it is plugged in). It is not a real time clock, but does the job of making each generated OTP string unique, as well as provides enough ordering information for the checker to detect when OTP strings are suspiciously out of sequence.
3) It does not prevent "someone else generating an spoofed password [OTP string] using your seed [secret key] and the timestamp" because the secret key is central piece of information that makes this work. If someone has the secret key, then they could generate OTP strings. Without the secret key, there is no way for an attacker to create a valid string. The hardware is designed so that the secret key cannot be extracted from the YubiKey. However, the secret key does need to be protected on the computer side too. But I suspect that this should be no worse than trying to protect fingerprint scanner data.
Ideally, if someone stole your computer they still would not be able to decrypt the keystore. To achieve this, the keystore decryption key must not reside on the computer itself. This could be done by embedding the keystore decryption key into the "private ID" field of the OTP string. Although the shared secret is on the computer (since it needs this to decrypt OTP strings for validation), without a real OTP string they would not have the keystore decryption key. This is no less secure than the current use of a master password.
The only limitation here is that the "private ID" is only 6 bytes (48 bits). Since 40 bit DES can be cracked by brute force, 48 bits is only marginally more difficult. And you might want to use some of those 6 bytes for other purposes, reducing its length. It could be argued that this is still better than many short master passwords that people would pick, so having just the YubiKey would still offer better security for many users.
Alternatively, maybe 1Password can be set up to require both a YubiKey OTP string plus a "mini passphrase". The keystore decryption key is derived from both the "private ID" from the OTP string plus the mini passphrase. The mini passphrase increases the key length of the keystore decryption key, so that it is no longer brute forceable. Also, this would give 1Password two factor authentication: something you have and something you know. Even if someone got hold of the YubiKey, they would not be able to use it without knowing the mini passphrase. Depending on how secure the user wants to be, the mini passphrase could be zero length (because they are happy with a 48 bit keystore decryption key) or as strong as the master password they would have used if they didn't have a YubiKey.
One more thing, you still would want 1Password to have a master password (just in case you loose your YubiKey). However, since the user doesn't need to enter the master password every time, it can be much longer and stronger. They can make it hideously cryptic, write it down and keep it somewhere safe. I think the user interface can still be kept simple, with one big text field for entering either a master password, an OTP string, or a mini password plus an OTP string -- the 1Password program can easily work out which one has been entered.
Documentation of the YubiKey fields can be found in the YubiKey Manual at http://www.yubico.com/products/documentation/
The "Security Now" episode 143 (mentioned by Raymo) is available at http://www.grc.com/securitynow.htm#143
P.S. The support ticket URLs listed above do not work.
Have you seen the Yubikey yet? (http://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey/). It's quite interesting. Can you look at providing support for it. I'd like to be able to open up 1PW by using the Yubikey instead of typing my master password. Let us know what you think.
Thanks.
https://lastpass.com/index.php
Thanks for considering it.
Kevin
Any chance those can be added? Given that LastPass is either free or 12 bucks a year . . .it's cheaper than 1Password and provides some additional security features.
Team Member
That's definitely an interesting idea. I'm not sure if/when we could do something like this, but I'm afraid it won't be very soon. We are always open to change, though, and development plans can change very quickly.
Thanks for the feedback!
Edit: I forgot to mention, welcome to the forums, Neil! We're glad you are around, and please feel free to offer additional feedback, as well as post questions or problems here in the forums.
Team Member
Welcome to the forums, johnbtz, and thanks for the vote!
No worries. I know as a company (I can relate) you have to prioritize features based on available resources and requests.